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Abstract
Dynamic Epistemic Logic makes it possible to model and reason about information
change in multi-agent systems. Information change is mathematically modeled through
epistemic action Kripke models introduced by Baltag et al. Also, van Ditmarsch inter-
prets the information change as a relation between epistemic states and sets of epistemic
states and to describe it formally, he considers a special constructor LB called learning
operator. Inspired by this, it seems natural to us that the basic source of information
change in a multi-agent system should be learning an announcement by some agents
together, privately, concurrently or even wrongly. Hence moving along this path, we
introduce the notion of a learning program and prove that all finite K45 action models
can be described by our learning programs.
1 Introduction
A computable function over strings of a finite alphabet is a function that can be computed
by a Turing machine. A Turing machine takes a string as input, performs a sequence of
elementary changes on the string and if it halts, it provides another string as output of the
function. In recursion theory all Turing computable function can be obtained via some initial
functions: zero, successor, and projections through applying some basic operations such as
composition, primitive recursion and least search. In this paper, our goal is to develop a
similar methodology for a class of epistemic functions. Following the same terminology, an
epistemic function is a function that takes the epistemic state of a multi-agent system as
input and yields a new epistemic state as output. The notion of epistemic function is the
focus of Dynamic Epistemic Logic, Baltag et al. [4, 5], and is formalized in action models.
These functions act on Kripke models via an update operator and produce an update Kripke
model. In this paper, we concentrate on those epistemic functions which can be coded as
K45 action models. K45 models are those models which accessibly relations transitive and
Euclidian. We claim that there are possible information changes which are not possible to
encode them by KD45 or S5 action models. Consequently K45 action models are more
powerful to describe epistemic functions than KD45 and S5 action models. It is why we
consider K45 action models instead of S5 or KD45 models.
So far no one has looked at it from a computational aspect to answer the following
question
what are the initial functions and the basic operations by which all K45 epis-
temic functions can be obtained?
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The basic source of information change in a multi-agent system is learning an announce-
ment by some agents together, privately, concurrently or even wrongly. So the basic operators
should be different kinds of learning. Van Ditmarsch et al. introduced a learning constructor
in [7, 8]. We define our own learning operator which is different from van Ditmarsch’s.
As our initial functions, we take the test of any facts ϕ, that is ?ϕ. For the basic
operations, we take the following different kinds of learning: 1- alternative learning, 2-
concurrent learning, 3- wrong learning, and finally, 4- recursive learning. Following the
footsteps of recursion theory, we prove that all epistemic functions can be obtained through
the test of facts by applying the above four basic operations.
Epistemic logic, started with Hintikka’s groundwork [14], models and reasons about the
knowledge of agents in a group [12]. In Epistemic logic, the notions of knowledge and belief
are modeled in terms of the possible worlds (states). An agent knows or believes a fact if
it is true in all the worlds that the agent considers possible as alternatives for the actual
world.
As information is transmitted, knowledge and belief of agents in a multi-agent system
may change. The simplest cause for an information change is to announce some truth in
public. Plaza in 1989 [15], introduced a logic to formalize these changes and called it the
public announcement logic. In public announcement logic, a fact is publicly announced
in a multi-agent system and all agents together update their knowledge and belief. How-
ever, more complex actions than such as private or dishonest announcements may occur,
this is whereby different agents may have different views on some action [4, 5, 7], or the
announcement may not be truthful.
Our work may be considered as a bridge between two paradigms in dynamic epistemic
logic, namely Baltag et al. style action model and van Ditmarsch et al. epistemic actions.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we recall the definition of action models
from [4], and we explain what it means that a group of agents learns an action model.
We discuss K45 Kripke models which only have transitive and Euclidian properties. We
also introduce a new notion called the applicable formulas, and restrict the definition of
satisfaction relation only to applicable formulas.
In section 3, we introduce the initial functions and basic operations as the building
blocks of the finite epistemic functions.
In section 4, we add the new operator of recursion in constructing the finite epistemic
functions.
Finally, in section 5, we compare our work with other related works, and further works
may be done.
2 Backgrounds
In this section, we introduce two significant notion: 1- learning an action model, 2- K45
Kripke models and applicable formulas.
2.1 Action models
We start by recalling the definition of an action model from Baltag [4]. A pointed action
model (N, s0) is a tuple N = 〈S, (⇀a)a∈A, pre〉, where S is a set of events, A is a set of
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agents, ⇀a is an accessibility relation for agent a on events in S, and pre is a function that
assigns to each event, a formula of an appropriate epistemic language, as a precondition for
that event. s0 ∈ S is called the actual event.
Announcements of facts in multi-agent systems give rises to information changes, where
different agents have different access to the resource of the announcement, and also different
views about the access of other agents to the resource.
For instance, consider the pointed action model (N1, s) in Figure 1, where S = {s, t},
s ⇀a t, t ⇀a t, pre(s) = ϕ, pre(t) = ψ.
Figure 1
Here (N1, s) encodes the following information change
“ ϕ is announced whereas agent a (wrongly) learns ψ.”
One may assume that ϕ = green and ψ = blue, are two different colors. Then the action
model (N1, s) says that a green ball is shown to a, whereas agent a thinks that she sees a
blue ball.
Consider the pointed model (N2, s) in Figure 2, where S = {s, t}, s ⇀b s, s ⇀a t,
t ⇀a t, pre(s) = ϕ and pre(t) = ψ.
Figure 2
This action model encodes the following information change: “a green ball is shown to
agents a and b, agent b sees a green ball and is aware that agent a has a color-blindness and
sees a blue ball. Agent a just sees a blue ball and has no idea about what b sees”.
Remark 2.1 The word “having no idea” used above is vague, and needs to be clarified.
In the action model N1, agent b is not present in the state t. So agent a has no idea about
the information of agent b. There could be lots of possibilities about the color-blindness of
b at state t, but the action model says nothing about it. We will later introduce the notion
of applicable formulas (see Definition 2.7) to formally model this case.
For another example, consider the pointed model (N3, s) in Figure 3, where S = {s, t},
s ⇀b s, t ⇀b s s ⇀a t, t ⇀a t, pre(s) = ϕ and pre(t) = ψ.
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Figure 3
The action model (N3, s) encodes the information change that “a green ball is shown to
agents a and b, agent b sees a green ball and is aware that agent a has a color-blindness
and sees a blue ball. Agent a sees a blue ball and wrongly thinks that agent b has a
color-blindness and sees a green ball. Moreover, both agents are aware about each other’s
thoughts”.
According to the above discussion, a pointed action model (N, s), where N = 〈S, (⇀a
)a∈A, pre〉, encodes the information change that
the fact pre(s) is announced whereas each agent (relevant to its accessibility rela-
tion in the action model) acquires information of what may have been announced
and what other agents may have heard.
2.2 Learning an Action Model
We should also clarify what it means that a group of agents learns an action model. Suppose
(N, s) is a pointed action model, and B is a group of agents. The case that
“group B learns (N, s)”,
is a new action model which encodes the following information change
“the fact pre(s) is announced and group B learns the fact pre(s) and the infor-
mation that other agents (excluding B) acquires due to learning (N, s)”.
For example, recall the pointed action model (N1, s) in Figure 1, where it encodes the
following information change
“ϕ is announced whereas agent a (wrongly) learns ψ”.
An agent b learns (N1, s) means
“ϕ is announced and agent b learns that ϕ is announced and the fact that agent
a (wrongly) learns ψ. Agent a still wrongly learns ψ and has no idea about what
b learns”.
The case that agent b learns (N1, s), denoted by Lb((N1, s)), is encoded by the pointed
action model (N2, s) in Figure 2.
Four different kinds of learning, in a multi-agent system, may be distinguished:
1. Alternative Learning: a group of agents, B, together learns that among a set of
actions (M1, s1), (M2, s2), ..., (Mk, sk), one of them is the actual action.
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Example 2.2 Let (M1, s1) be the pointed action model (N1, s1) in Figure 1, and
(M2, s2) be another action model, in which M2 = 〈S = {s2}, ∅, pre(s2) = χ〉. Then
the pointed action model of Lb((M1, s1), (M2, s2)) is
Figure 4
See Definition 3.2 for details.
2. Concurrent Learning: two disjoint groups of agents B1 and B2 learn concurrently
but not together; group B1 learns (N1, s1) and group B2 learns (N2, s2) concurrently
but not together.
Example 2.3 Let (M1, s1) be the pointed action model (N1, s1) in Figure 1, and
(M2, s2) be another pointed action model, in whichM2 = 〈S = {s2}, (s2 ⇀b s2), pre(s2) =
ϕ〉. Then the pointed action model of (M1, s1) ∩ (M2, s2) would be
Figure 5
See Definition 3.2 for details.
3. Wrong Learning: whereas a fact ψ is announced, a group of agents, B, wrongly
learns something else.
Example 2.4 ϕ is announced and agent a learns ψ. See the pointed action model
(N1, s1) in Figure 1.
4. Recursive Learning: a group of agents, B1, learns what another group of agents,
B2, learns, and group B2 learns what group B1 learns.
Example 2.5 Consider the pointed action model (N3, s) in Figure 3.
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Figure 3
The action model (N3, s) means
ϕ is announced and agent b learns
{ ϕ and the case that agent a (wrongly) learns
{ψ and about what b (wrongly) learns}
}.
2.3 Epistemic Logic
In this section we briefly go through the syntax and semantics of epistemic logic. The syntax
of epistemic logic is as usual, but the semantics is a little bit different from the standard
one.
Definition 2.6 Let P be a non-empty set of propositional variables, and A be a set of
agents. The language L(A,P ) is the smallest superset of P such that
if ϕ,ψ ∈ L(A,P ) then ¬ϕ, (ϕ ∧ ψ), Kiϕ ∈ L(A,P ),
for i ∈ A.
For i ∈ A, Kiϕ has to be read as ‘agent i believes (knows) ϕ”. For a group of agents
B ⊆ A, KBϕ means that Kiϕ, for all i ∈ B.
Epistemic logic models the notions of knowledge and belief in terms of the notion of
possible worlds in Kripke semantics.
Definition 2.7 A Kripke model M is a tuple M = 〈S, (⇀i)i∈A, V 〉, where S is a non-
empty set of worlds (states) s ∈ S, V is a function from P to 2S, and each ⇀i is a binary
accessibility relation between worlds. We define the group present at the state (M, s) as
follows:
gr((M, s)) = {i ∈ A | (∃t ∈ S) s ⇀i t}.
For an epistemic state (M, s), the set of applicable formulas at the state (M, s), denoted
by Φ(M,s) ⊆ L(A,P ), is the smallest subset satisfying the following conditions
1. P ⊆ Φ(M,s),
2. if ϕ,ψ ∈ Φ(M,s) then ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Φ(M,s) and ¬ϕ ∈ Φ(M,s),
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3. Kiϕ ∈ Φ(M,s) if and only if i ∈ gr((M, s)) and for all t such that s ⇀i t, ϕ ∈ Φ(M,t).
Intuitively, the applicable formulas of an epistemic state, are those formulas that can
sensibly be assigned a truth value. For example, consider the Kripke model in Figure 6.
Figure 6
As agent b is not present in the world t, formulas like Kbχ are not applicable in the world
t (it is not possible to talk about the truth of Kbχ in world t, where agent b is not present
in this world). Also the formula Ka(Kbp ∨Kb¬p) is not applicable at the world s. In the
next definition, we restrict the definition of truth to applicable formulas.
Definition 2.8 In order to determine whether an applicable formula ϕ ∈ Φ(M,s) is true in
the epistemic state (M, s), denoted by (M, s) |= ϕ, we look at the structure of ϕ:
(M, s) |= p iff s ∈ V (p)
(M, s) |= (ϕ ∧ ψ) iff (M, s) |= ϕ and (M, s) |= ψ
(M, s) |= ¬ϕ iff not (M, s) |= ϕ ((M, s) 6|= ϕ)
(M, s) |= Kiϕ iff for all t such that s ⇀i t, (M, t) |= ϕ
Note that the satisfaction relation is just defined for applicable formulas.
The standard epistemic logic S5 consists of axioms A1−A5 and the derivation rules R1
and R2 given below
R1: ` ϕ, ` ϕ→ ψ ⇒ ` ψ
R2: ` ϕ⇒ Kiϕ, for all i ∈ A
A1: Axioms of propositional logic
A2: (Kiϕ ∧Ki(ϕ→ ψ))→ Kiψ
A3: Kiϕ→ ϕ
A4: Kiϕ→ KiKiϕ
A5: ¬Kiϕ→ Ki¬Kiϕ
If instead of A3, we assume the weaker axiom D (given below), the logic of belief KD45
will be specified.
D: ¬(Kiϕ ∧Ki¬ϕ).
Definition 2.9 Let M = 〈S, (⇀a)a∈A, V 〉 be a Kripke model. For each a ∈ A, we say that
the relation ⇀a is
1) reflexive if and only if for all s ∈ S, s ⇀a s;
2) serial if and only if for all s ∈ S, there exists t ∈ S such that s ⇀a t;
3) transitive if and only if for all s, t, u ∈ S, if s ⇀a t and t ⇀a u then s ⇀a u;
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4) Euclidean if and only if for all three states s, t, u ∈ S if s ⇀a t and s ⇀a u then
t ⇀a u.
We say a relation ⇀a is
• S5 whenever it is reflexive, transitive and Euclidean,
• KD45 whenever it is serial, transitive and Euclidean, and
• K45 whenever it is transitive and Euclidean.
A Kripke model M is called an S5 model if and only if for each agent a, ⇀a is S5. It is
obvious that every S5 model is a model of the standard epistemic logic. A Kripke model M
is called an KD45 model if and only if for each agent a, ⇀a is KD45.
We also say a Kripke model M to be a K45 model if and only if for each agent a, ⇀a
is K45.
An action model N is called a K45 model if and only if for each agent a, ⇀a is K45,
and it is an S5 model if and only if for each agent a, ⇀a is S5. For example, the action
model in Figure 2 is K45.
Definition 2.10 Let P be a set of atomic formulas, A be a set of agents, and Φ be a set
of epistemic formulas over atomic formulas P and agents in A.
We use FAct(Φ) (or simply FAct) to refer to the set of all pointed epistemic action
models (N, t) such that N is a finite K45 model, and the image of pre is Φ.
We use Mod(A,P ) (or simply Mod) to refer to the set of all epistemic states (M, s)
such that M is K45.
We recall definition of bisimulation of actions from [9]. Consider two action models
N = 〈S, (⇀a)a∈A, pre〉 and N′ = 〈S′, (⇀′a)a∈A, pre′〉. The pointed action model (N, s) is
bisimilar to (N′, s′), denoted by (N, s) ' (N′, s′), whenever there is a relation R ⊆ S × S′
satisfying the following conditions, for each agent a ∈ A:
Initial. R(s, s′).
Forth. If R(t, t′) and t ⇀a v, then there is a v′ ∈ S′ such that R(v, v′) and t′ ⇀′a v′.
Back. If R(t, t′) and t′ ⇀′a v′, then there is a v ∈ S such that R(v, v′) and t ⇀a v.
Pre. If R(t, t′), then pre(t) is equivalent to pre(t′) in KD45 belief logic.
We define another notion of equivalence on action models and call it agent-bisimulation.
Definition 2.11 Let a ∈ A be an arbitrary agent. Two pointed action models (N, s) and
(N′, s′) are a-bisimilar whenever
Forth. If s ⇀a t, then there is a t
′ ∈ S′ such that s′ ⇀′a t′ and (N, t) ' (N′, t′).
Back. If s′ ⇀′a t′, then there is a t ∈ S such that s ⇀a t and (N, t) ' (N′, t′).
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The execution of a pointed action model (N, t) ∈ FAct on an epistemic state (M, s) ∈
Mod is a new epistemic state (M ∗N, (s, t)), where M ∗N = 〈S, (⇀i)i∈A, V 〉 and
S = {(s1, t1) | s1 ∈ N, t1 ∈M, (M, s1) |= pre(t1)},
(s1, t1) ⇀i (s2, t2) iff s1 ⇀i s2 and t1 ⇀i t2,
(s1, t1) ∈ V (p) iff s1 ∈ V (p).
Proposition 2.12 Suppose (N, t) ∈ FAct and (M, s) ∈ Mod. Then (M ∗N, (s, t)) ∈ Mod,
i.e., it is a K45 model.
Proof. It is straightforward. a
2.4 Why K45 Models and Applicable Formulas?
K45 Kripke models are more general than KD45 models, as they necessarily do not have
the serial property. The reason that we consider serial property for KD45 model is that, we
want the agent’s belief to be consistent. For K45 Kripke models, we consider the definition
of satisfaction relation just for applicable formulas. In this way, the agent’s beliefs are
consistent at each state. Moreover,
regarding applicable formulas, the class of K45 models is a (sound and complete)
semantics for logic of belief KD45.
Assume that a formula ϕ is derivable from the logic of belief, i.e., KD45 ` ϕ. Then for
every K45 pointed model (M, s), if ϕ is applicable at this state, then (M, s) |= ϕ. Also, note
that every KD45 model is also a K45 model. So for any formula ϕ, if for all K45 pointed
model (M, s) which ϕ is applicable at the state, we have (M, s) |= ϕ then KD45 ` ϕ.
Since K45 models are more general than KD45 models, we can encode more epistemic
functions in K45 models, as we do not have to determine the cases where an agent does
not have any idea about the belief of another agent. For example, consider the following
information change:
a green ball is shown to agents a and b, agent b sees a green ball and is aware
that agent a has a color-blindness and sees a blue ball. Agent a just sees a blue
ball and has no idea about what b sees.
In the above information change, agent a has no idea about what b sees. Agent a says I
do not have any idea, there could be lots of possibilities and I do not know even how many
possibilities exist, may be an infinite number of them. It would be possible that agent b
sees a cube instead of a ball, or even an elephant, and etc. It would be possible that agent
b sees the ball in a color which is unknown for me.
In KD45 models, we are forced to encode all possibilities, but if it happens that some
possibilities are unknown, then we don’t know what to do. However such information change
can be encoded by the K45 action model in figure 2.
Therefore, considering applicable formulas, the class of K45 models is still a semantics
for logic of belief (similar to the class of KD45 models) and moreover, they are enough
general than KD45 models for describing information changes formally.
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3 Basic Learning Programs
As mentioned in the introduction, our goal is to introduce some initial functions and basic
operators as the building blocks of all finite epistemic functions (FAct). In this section, we
introduce the first class of epistemic learning programs, called basic learning programs. The
reason these are called basic is that they do not include any recursion in their structure.
Definition 3.1 Let Φ be a set of epistemic formulas over a set of atomic formulas P and
a set of agents A. The set of basic learning programs BLP(Φ) is defined as follows:
i. Test. for all ϕ ∈ Φ, ?ϕ is a basic learning program, and we define group(?ϕ) = ∅,
and pre(?ϕ) = ϕ,
ii. Alternative Learning. for all n ∈ N, and B ⊆ A, if α1, α2, ..., αn are basic
learning programs, then LB(α1, α2, ..., αn) is a basic learning program, and we define
group(LB(α1, α2, ..., αn)) = B ∪ group(α1) and pre(LB(α1, α2, ..., αn)) = pre(α1),
iii. Concurrent Learning. if α1, α2 are basic learning programs such that pre(α1) =
pre(α2) and group(α1)∩group(α2) = ∅, then α1∩α2 is a basic learning program. We
define group(α1 ∩ α2) = group(α1) ∪ group(α2), and pre(α1 ∩ α2) = pre(α1),
iv. Wrong Learning. if α1 is a basic learning program and ψ is an epistemic formula, then
ψ|Bα1 is a basic learning program whenever B ⊆ group(α1). We define group(ψ|Bα1) =
B and pre(ψ|Bα1) = ψ.
To each basic learning program, we associate a pointed action model as follows.
Definition 3.2 Semantics of BLP.
1. for all ϕ ∈ Φ, the pointed action model of the program ?ϕ, is (N?ϕ, s?ϕ), where
N?ϕ = 〈{s?ϕ}, (⇀a)a∈A, pre〉,
in which for all a ∈ A, ⇀a= ∅ and pre(s?ϕ) = ϕ.
2. Suppose α1, α2, ..., αk are basic learning programs and their associated action models
are (N1, s1), (N2, s2), ..., (Nk, sk), where Nl = 〈Sl, (⇀la)a∈A, prel〉, for 1 ≤ l ≤ k,
and ∩1≤l≤kSk = ∅. Then the associated action model to the basic learning program
LB(α1, α2, ..., αn) is (N, s), where N = 〈S, (⇀a)a∈A, pre〉 and
– S = {(s1, 1), (s2, 1), ..., (sk, 1)} ∪ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ ... ∪ Sk,
– for all b ∈ B, for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, if si is b-bisimilar to sj then (si, 1) ⇀b (sj , 1),
– for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k, for all a ∈ gr(Nj , sj) − B, for all t ∈ Sj, if sj ⇀ja t then
(sj , 1) ⇀a t,
– for all a ∈ A, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, for all v, t ∈ Si, if v ⇀ia t then v ⇀a t,
– s = (s1, 1),
– pre((sl, 1)) = pre(sl) for all 1 ≤ l ≤ k.
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The associated action model of LB(α1, α2, ..., αn) means: pre(α1) is announced whereas
agents in B learn that either α1 or α2 or ... or αk has been executed, and what other
agents learn in each alternative case.
3. Suppose α1, α2 are basic learning programs and their associated action models are
(N1, s1) and (N2, s2) respectively, where Nl = 〈Sl, (⇀la)a∈Al , prel〉 for l = 1 or l = 2,
A1 ∩ A2 = ∅ and S1 ∩ S2 = ∅. Then the pointed action model of the basic learning
program α1 ∩ α2 is (N, s) with N = 〈S, (⇀a)a∈A, pre〉, where
– S = {s} ∪ S1 ∪ S2, for some s 6∈ S1 ∪ S2,
– for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 2, for all a ∈ Ai, if v ⇀ia t then v ⇀a t,
– for all 1 ≤ j ≤ 2, for all a ∈ Aj, if sj ⇀ja t then s ⇀a t,
– pre(s) = pre(s1).
The associated action model of α1 ∩ α2 means: pre(α1) is announced whereas agents
in group(α1) learn according to execution of α1, agents in group(α2) learn according
to execution of α2.
4. Suppose α is a basic learning program and its associated action model is (N1, s1),
where N1 = 〈S, (⇀1a)a∈A, pre1〉. Then the associated action model of ψ|Bα is (N, s)
with N = 〈S, (⇀a)a∈A, pre〉, where
– S = {s} ∪ S1, for some s 6∈ S1,
– for all a ∈ A, if v ⇀1a t then v ⇀a t,
– for all b ∈ B, if s1 ⇀1b t then s ⇀b t,
– pre(s) = ψ.
The associated action model of ψ|Bα1 means: ψ is announced whereas agents in group
B wrongly learn according to execution of α1.
The action model of a program α is denoted by (Nα, sα). An epistemic action (N, t) ∈
FAct(Φ) is called basic learning action whenever there is a basic learning programs α ∈
BLP(Φ) such that (Nα, sα) is bisimilar to (N, t).
Example 3.3 The action model associated with the basic learning program
Lb(ϕ|aLa?ψ).
is bisimilar to the action model illustrated in Figure 2.
The action model illustrated in Figure 4 is a basic learning action. It is bisimilar to the
action model associated with the basic learning program
Lb(ϕ|aLa?ψ, ?χ).
Also, the action model associated with the basic learning program
ϕ|aLa?ψ ∩ ϕ|bLb?ϕ.
is bisimilar with the action model illustrated in Figure 5.
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Definition 3.4 Let N = 〈S, (⇀a)a∈A, pre〉 be an K45 action model.
• An S5 submodel of N is an S5 action model M = 〈S′, (⇀′a)a∈B, pre′〉, where S′ ⊆ S,
pre′ = pre|S′, B ⊆ A and for all a ∈ B, ⇀′a=⇀a |S′. An S5 submodel is called
connected whenever all two different states of the model are reachable from each
other. It is called closed whenever for all s, t ∈ S, if s ∈ S′ and for some a ∈ B,
s ⇀a t, then t ∈ S′.
• Let M ′ = 〈S′, (⇀′a)a∈B, pre′〉 and M ′′ = 〈S′′, (⇀′′a)a∈C , pre′′〉 be two closed connected
S5 action submodels of N . We write M ′ ≤ M ′′ whenever S′ ⊆ S′′ and B ⊆ C. One
may easily verify that ≤ is a partial order relation.
• Assume M i = 〈Si, (⇀ia)a∈Bi , prei〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ k are all different maximal closed con-
nected S5 submodel of N with respect to the partial order relation ≤. We construct
the action model T (N) = 〈S′, (⇀′a)a∈A, pre′〉 as follows:
– S′ =
⋃
1≤i≤k(S
i × {i})
– (s, i) ⇀′a (t, j) if and only if either i = j and s ⇀ia t, or i 6= j, a 6∈ Bi, a ∈ Bj,
and s ⇀a t (in the action model N).
– pre′((s, i)) = prei(s).
• The projection of a state (s, i) in the action model T (N), denoted by Π((s, i)), is
defined to be the state s in the action model N .
• For the action model N , we define the directed graph of N , denoted by G(N) as
follows:
– Each node G(N) is a maximal closed connected S5 submodel M i of N .
– Between two different nodes M i,M j, there exists a directed edge M i  M j
if and only if there exists an accessibility relation in the action model T (N),
(s, i) ⇀′a (t, j), for some s ∈ Si, a ∈ A, and t ∈ Sj.
It is obvious that an S5 submodel of a K45 action model may be connected but not
closed and vice versa.
Proposition 3.5 Let N = 〈S, (⇀a)a∈A, pre〉 be a K45 action model. Then (N, s0) is
bisimilar to (T (N), w0) for all s0 and w0 for which the state s0 is the projection of w0.
Proof. See the Appendix.a
Theorem 3.6 If a pointed K45 action model (N, s) is a basic learning action, then its
graph G(N) is a tree.
Proof. See the Appendix.a
Example 3.7 Consider the action model (N3, s) shown in Figure 3. There is no basic
learning program α such that its action model is (N3, s). That is because G(N3) is not a
tree.
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We showed that the graph of the basic learning actions are trees. The converse is also
true, that is, for each K45 pointed action model (N, s), if its graph is a tree then it is
associated to a basic learning program up to bisimilarity.
Proposition 3.8 All S5 pointed action models are basic learning actions.
Proof. See the Appendix.a
Theorem 3.9 If the graph of a finite K45 pointed model (N, s) is a finite tree, then (N, s)
is a basic learning action.
Proof. See the Appendix.a
3.1 Comparing two Learning Operators
In this part, we aim to compare our proposed learning operator with the learning operator
introduced in [8]. We begin with the same example “Lecture or Amsterdam” discussed
in [8].
Anne and Bert are in a bar, sitting at a table. A messenger comes in and
delivers a letter addressed to Anne. The letter contains either an invitation for
a night out in Amsterdam or an obligation to give a lecture instead. Anne and
Bert commonly know that these are the only alternatives.
Consider the following information change scenario:
• (spy-seeing). Bert says good bye to Anne and leaves the bar. During his leaving, he
secretly spies from the window of the bar that whether Anne reads the letter, Anne
does not get aware that Bert spies on her, and wrongly thinks that she is alone (Bert
is not present) while she reads the letter.
Suppose that p stands for “Anna is invited for a night out in Amsterdam”, and also
assume that in fact p is true.
It is not possible to model the above information change scenario in concurrent dy-
namic epistemic logic [8]. But we can model above scenario by the following basic learning
programs.
Lb(La?p, La?¬p).
The pointed action model associated to the above learning program is (N, s), where S =
{s, t, v, u}, s ⇀a v, v ⇀a v, t ⇀a u, u ⇀a u, and s ⇀b s, s ⇀b t, t ⇀b s, t ⇀b t, and
pre(s) = pre(v) = p, pre(t) = pre(u) = ¬p.
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The pointed action model associated to Lb(La?p, La?¬p)
A candidate to describe the action “spy-seeing” in formalization presented in [8] could be
Lb(!La?p∪La?¬p). But the term Lb(!La?p∪La?¬p) is not a well-formed action in concurrent
dynamic epistemic logic since it does not satisfy definition 6 of [8]. In this definition if LBα
is a well-formed action then gr(α) ⊆ B. Whereas, gr(La?p∪La?¬p) = {a}, and {a} 6⊆ {b}.
For another example, we discuss the following information change scenario:
• (spy-reading). Bert says good bye to Anne and leaves the bar. using a hidden
camera, Bert spies on Anne when she reads the letter, and Bert gets aware of the
contents of the letter using the camera. Anne wrongly thinks that she is alone, and
there is no spy on her.
Again, it is not possible to model the above information change scenario in concurrent
dynamic epistemic logic [8]. But we can model above scenario by the following basic learning
programs Lb(La?p).
The pointed action model associated to Lb(La?p)
The pointed action model associated to the above learning program is (N, s), where S =
{s, t}, s ⇀b s, s ⇀a t, t ⇀a t, and pre(s) = pre(t) = p.
Again note that the term Lb(La?p) is not a well-formed action in concurrent dynamic
epistemic logic as {a} 6⊆ {b}.
We can also model scenarios introduced in [8] via basic learning programs as follows:
1- (tell). Anne read the letter aloud: Lab?p.
The pointed action model associated to Lab?p
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2- (read). Both Bert and Anne are present in the bar, sitting on a table, and Bert is
seeing that Anne reads the letter: Lab(La?p, La?¬p).
The pointed action model associated to Lab(La?p, La?¬p)
3- (mayread) Bert orders a drink at the bar so that Anne may have read the letter (and
actually Anne reads the letter)
Lab(α, β, γ),
where
– α := La?p ∩ p|bLb?> (Anne reads the letter, and in fact p is true),
– β := La?¬p ∩ ¬p|bLb?> (Anne reads the letter, and in fact ¬p is true),
– γ := La?> ∩ Lb?> (Anne does not read the letter)
- The pointed action model associated to α, denoted by (N1, s1), is S = {s1, t1, v1},
s1 ⇀a t1, s1 ⇀b v1, t1 ⇀a t1, v1 ⇀b v1, and pre(s1) = pre(t1) = p, pre(v1) = >.
- The pointed action model associated to β, denoted by (N2, s2), is S = {s2, t2, v2},
s2 ⇀a t2, s2 ⇀b v2, t2 ⇀a t2, v2 ⇀b v2, and pre(s2) = pre(t2) = ¬p, pre(v2) = >.
The pointed action model associated to β, denoted by (N3, s3), is S = {s3, t3, v3},
s3 ⇀a t3, s3 ⇀b v3, t3 ⇀a t3, v3 ⇀b v3, and pre(s3) = pre(t3) = pre(v3) = >.
One may easily check that for every i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (Ni, si) is b-bisimilar to (Nj , sj).
Also, for every i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (Ni, si) is a-bisimilar to (Nj , sj) if and only if i = j.
Therefore, the action model associated to Lab(α, β, γ) is (N, 1), where S = {1, 2, 3},
1 ⇀a 1, 2 ⇀a 2, 3 ⇀a 3, and 1 ⇀b 1, 2 ⇀b 2, 3 ⇀b 3, and 1 ⇀b 2, 2 ⇀b 3, 3 ⇀b 1,
and pre(1) = p, pre(2) = ¬p, and pre(3) = >.
4- (bothmayread). Bert orders a drink at the bar while Anne goes to the bathroom.
Both may have read the letter (and actually both of them have read).
Lab(La?p ∩ Lb?p, La?¬p ∩ Lb?¬p, La?> ∩ Lb?>, La?p ∩ p|bLb?>, La¬p ∩
¬p|bLb?>, Lb?p ∩ p|aLa?>, Lb¬p ∩ ¬p|aLa?>).
Four above information change scenarios are also modelled in concurrent dynamic epis-
temic logic in example 7, of [8]. Also, in Figure 1 of [8], page 4, Epistemic states resulted
from the execution of actions (for these scenarios) described in concurrent dynamic epis-
temic logic (example 7, of [8]) is shown. It easy to verify that
Epistemic states resulted from the execution of pointed action models associated
to basic learning programs for these scenarios (introduced above) are exactly the
same Epistemic states resulted from the execution actions described in concur-
rent dynamic epistemic logic [8] (and shown in Figure 1 of the same reference,
in page 4).
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4 Learning by Recursion
By learning by recursion, we mean the cases where agents learn about each other’s learning,
i.e., an agent a learns something about learning of another agent b and agent b also learns
about learning of agent a. In this way, a recursive learning occurs. In this section, we
introduce recursive learning actions to model this type of learning.
In the following definition, undf , indicates that the term is undefined.
Definition 4.1 Let Φ be a set of epistemic formulas over a set of atomic formulas P and
a set of agents A, and V ar = {X,Y, Z, ...} be a set of variables. The set of open terms
OpenT(Φ) is defined as follows:
1. for all X ∈ V ar, X is an open term, we let pre(X) = undf and group(X) = undf ,
2. for all ϕ ∈ Φ, ?ϕ is an open term, group(?ϕ) = ∅, and pre(?ϕ) = ϕ,
3. for all n ∈ N, and B ⊆ A, if α1, α2, ..., αn are open terms, then LB(α1, α2, ..., αn) is
an open term, and we let
group(LB(α1, α2, ..., αn)) = B ∪ group(α1), and
pre(LB(α1, α2, ..., αn)) = pre(α1)
Note that the left sides are defined if group(α1) and pre(α1) are defined.
4. α1 ∩ α2 is an open term whenever α1 and α2 are open terms. If both group(α1),
group(α2) are defined and group(α1)∩group(α2) = ∅, and if both pre(α1), pre(α2) are
defined and pre(α1) = pre(α2). Then we let group(α1 ∩α2) = group(α1)∪ group(α2)
and pre(α1 ∩ α2) = pre(α1),
5. ψ|Bα1 is an open term whenever α1 is an open term. If group(α1) is defined and
B ⊆ group(α1). We then define group(ψ|Bα1) = B and pre(ψ|Bα1) = ψ.
Definition 4.2 Assume α(X1, X2, ..., Xk) is an open term with k variables, the tuple
(β1, β2, ..., βk) ∈ OpenT(Φ)
is a suitable substitution for α(X1, X2, ..., Xk), whenever α(β1, β2, ..., βk) ∈ OpenT(Φ).
Now we define open action models, in order to be associated to open terms. For each vari-
able X, let (NX , sX) be a variable pointed action model, where NX = 〈SX , (⇀Xa )a∈A, preX〉
and the set SX , the relations ⇀
X
a , and the function pre
X are variables. The open action
model of an open term α(X1, X2, ..., Xk) is simply constructed using variable pointed ac-
tion models (NX1 , sX1), (NX2 , sX2), ..., and (NXk , sXk) and Definition 3.2. Substituting an
action model (N, s) in an open term α(X) is obtained by considering s instead of sX .
Example 4.3 Suppose A = {a, b}, and consider the open term LbLa(X). The open action
model (NLbLa(X), sLbLa(X)) is constructed as follows. We consider three states s0, s1 and sX ,
where pre(s0) = pre(s1) = pre(sX). The actual state is s0, and the accessibility relations
are s0 ⇀b s0, s0 ⇀a s1, s1 ⇀a s1, and , s1 ⇀b t for all t ∈ b[sX ], where b[sX ] is the set of
all states in the hypothetical model NX in which sX has b-accessibility to them. The open
action model of the term LbLa(X) is illustrated in Figure 8.
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Figure 8
1. Let (M, t0) be the action model of the term Lab(?ϕ), and S = {t0}, pre(t0) = ϕ, t0 ⇀a t0
and t0 ⇀b t0.
Figure 9
Substitution of (M, t0) for (NX , sX) means to substitute t0 for sX . Therefore, pre(sX) =
pre(t0) = ϕ and b[sX ] = b[t0] = {t0}. Substituting (M, t0) in (NLbLa(X), sLbLa(X)) yields to
the following action model
Figure 10
which is the action model of LaLbLab(?ϕ).
Example 4.4 Suppose A = {a, b}, and consider the open term Lb(ϕ|aLa(ψ|bLb(X))). The
open action model (NLb(ϕ|aLa(ψ|bLb(X))), sLb(ϕ|aLa(ψ|bLb(X)))) is shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 11
(NLb((NX ,sX)), sLb((NX ,sX))) is obtained by adding the new state (sX , 1) as the actual
state and adding new accessibility relations (sX , 1) ⇀b (sX , 1), and (sX , 1) ⇀a t, for all
t ∈ a[sX ]. We have pre((sX , 1)) = pre(sX), and sLb((NX ,sX)) = (sX , 1).
(Nψ|bLb(X), sψ|bLb(X)) is obtained by adding the new state sψ|bLb(X) to NLb((NX ,sX)), and
adding new accessibility relations sψ|bLb(X) ⇀b t, for all t ∈ b[sLb((NX ,sX))]. Moreover,
pre(sψ|bLb(X)) = ψ.
Continuing the above scenario and using Definition 3.2, the open action model in Fig-
ure 11 is constructed.
To obtain the open action model of Lb(ϕ|aLa(ψ|bLb(Lb(ϕ|aLa(ψ|bLb(X)))))), one may
simply consider two copies of the open action model (NLb(ϕ|aLa(ψ|bLb(X))) and replace the
actual state sLb(ϕ|aLa(ψ|bLb(X))) of one of them for sX in another one, and obtain the model
shown in Figure 12. By substituting sLb(ϕ|aLa(ψ|bLb(X))) for sX , the set a[sx] is {sψ|bLb(X)}.
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Figure 12
Fixed point of Lb(ϕ|aLa(ψ|bLb(X))). To construct an action model as a fixed point
of the term Lb(ϕ|aLa(ψ|bLb(X))), we consider the open action model (NLb(ϕ|aLa(ψ|bLb(X)))
and replace its actual state sLb(ϕ|aLa(ψ|bLb(X))) for sX (see Figure 13, the symbol sµX will
be defined in the next section).
Figure 13
It is easy to verify that the pointed action model in Figure 13 is bisimilar to the pointed
action model (N3, s) explained in Example 2.5 as a recursive learning action.
19
4.1 Recursive Learning Programs
One may check that the graph of the action model shown in Figure 3 is not a tree and
thus by Theroem 3.6, it is not a basic learning action. So we cannot describe it in terms
of alternative learning, LB(−,−, ...,−), concurrent learning ∩, and wrong learning, |B,
operators. We add a new operator µ to the language for recursive learning and show that
the action model shown in Figure 3 is a recursive learning action. To do this, we need to
slightly modify the Definition of open terms 4.1 as follows.
Definition 4.5 Let Φ be a set of epistemic formulas over a set of atomic formulas P and
a set of agents A, and V ar = {X,Y, Z, ...} be a set of variables. The set of open terms,
OT(Φ) is defined as follows:
1. for all X ∈ V ar, X is an open term, we let pre(X) = undf and group(X) = undf ,
2. for all ϕ ∈ L(Φ), ?ϕ is an open term, group(?ϕ) = ∅, and pre(?ϕ) = ϕ,
3. for all n ∈ N, and B ⊆ A, if α1, α2, ..., αn are open terms then LB(α1, α2, ..., αn) is
an open term, and we let
group(LB(α1, α2, ..., αn)) = B ∪ group(α1) and,
pre(LB(α1, α2, ..., αn)) = pre(α1)
Note that the left sides are defined if group(α1) and pre(α1) are defined.
4. α1 ∩ α2 is an open term whenever α1 and α2 are open terms. If both group(α1),
group(α2) are defined and group(α1)∩group(α2) = ∅, and if both pre(α1), pre(α2) are
defined and pre(α1) = pre(α2). Then we let group(α1 ∩α2) = group(α1)∪ group(α2)
, and pre(α1 ∩ α2) = pre(α1),
5. ψ|Bα1 is an open term whenever α1 is an open term. If group(α1) is defined and
B ⊆ group(α1), We define group(ψ|Bα1) = B and pre(ψ|Bα1) = ψ.
6. If α(X1, X2, ..., Xk) is an open term, and both
group(α(X1, X2, ..., Xk)) and
pre(α(X1, X2, ..., Xk))
are defined, then µX1.α(X1, X2, ..., Xk) is an open term with k − 1 free variables; the
variable X1 is bound under µX1. We define
group(µX.α(X1, X2, ..., Xk)) = group(α(X1, X2, ..., Xk)) and
pre(µX.α(X1, X2, ..., Xk)) = pre(α(X1, X2, ..., Xk)).
A term α ∈ OT(Φ) is closed if it has no unbounded variable.
Definition 4.6 Let Φ be a set of epistemic formulas. The set of recursive learning pro-
grams, RLP(Φ), is the set of all closed terms in OT(Φ).
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Definition 4.7 (Semantics of µX.α(X)). The associated pointed action model to µX.α(X)
is obtained by replacing the actual state sα(X) of the action model Nα(X) for the state sX .
The associated action model of µX.α(X) is actually a fixed point of the open action
model of α(X), see Example 4.4.
Example 4.8 The semantics of the recursive learning program
α := µX1.Lc(χ|aµX2.La(ϕ|bLb((ψ|aX2) ∩ (ψ|cX1))))
is constructed in the following way. The model of the open term
La(ϕ|bLb((ψ|aX2) ∩ (ψ|cX1)))
is shown in Figure 14.
Figure 14
The model of the open term
µX2.La(ϕ|bLb((ψ|aX2) ∩ (ψ|cX1)))
is shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15
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The action model of
Lc(χ|aµX2.La(ϕ|bLb((ψ|aX2) ∩ (ψ|cX1))))
is illustrated in Figure 16.
Figure 16
Finally the action model of the recursive learning program α is shown in Figure 17.
Figure 17
As two other examples, one may check that the action model associated to the recursive
learning program
µX.La(ϕ|bµY.Lb(ψ|aX ∩ ψ|cLc(θ|bY )))
is the pointed action model illustrated in Figure 18,
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Figure 18
and the action model associated to the recursive learning program
µX.La(ϕ|bLb(ϕ|aX), ψ|bLb(ϕ|aX))
is bisimilar to the pointed action model (N, s) illustrated in Figure 19.
Figure 19
4.2 Two Main Theorems
In this subsection, we present two main theorems of the paper. In the first one, Theorem
4.12, we show that every finite K45 action model is associated to some recursive learning
program and conversely, for every learning program, there is a finite K45 action model
associated with it. Then we introduce a hierarchy over learning programs with respect to
the number of recursive learning operators. In our second main Theorem 4.15, it is shown
that the hierarchy of the learning programs is strict, i.e., it is not possible to describe all
K45 action models by a determined finite number of recursion in learning. That means
that the hierarchy does not collapse.
4.2.1 Representing Epistemic Action Models
Definition 4.9 Let N = 〈S, (⇀a)a∈A, pre〉 be a K45 action model. For each agent a ∈ A,
an a-component of N is Ma = 〈S′, (⇀′a)a∈{a}, pre′〉, where Ma is an S5 closed connected
submodel of N .
Assume for all a ∈ A, M ia = 〈Sia, (⇀ia)a∈{a}, preia〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ ka are all different
a-component of N . We construct the action model T ′(N) = 〈S′, (⇀′a)a∈A, pre′〉 as
follows:
– S′ =
⋃
a∈A
⋃
1≤i≤ka(S
i
a × {(i, a)}),
– (s, (i, a)) ⇀′b (t, (j, b)) if and only if either i = j, a = b and s ⇀
i
a t, or i 6= j,
b 6= a, and s ⇀b t (in the action model N),
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– pre′((s, (i, a))) = preia(s).
The projection of an state (s, (i, a)) in the action model T ′(N), denoted by Π((s, (i, a))),
is defined to be the state s in the action model N .
Example 4.10 Consider the action models N1 and N2 in Figure 20. Their action models
T ′(N1) and T ′(N2) are illustrated in Figure 20 as well.
Figure 20
Proposition 4.11 Let N = 〈S, (⇀a)a∈A, pre〉 be an K45 action model. Then (N, s0) is
bisimilar to (T ′(N), w0) for all s0 and w0, in which the state s0 is the projection of w0.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.5. a
Theorem 4.12 All finite epistemic actions are recursive learning programs, i.e.,
FAct(Φ) = RLP(Φ).
Proof. See the Appendix.a
Example 4.13 It is shown in Figure 21, how to construct a program for the pointed action
model (N1, s) through the instruction argued in proof of the Theorem 4.12.
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Figure 21
4.2.2 A Hierarchy of Learning
Definition 4.14 For each k ∈ N, we define the class kRLP, of all finite K45 pointed
action models which can be described by a recursive learning program with at most k times
of dependent use of the recursive operator µ.
The term ‘dependent ’ in the above definition is crucial. In a program, two operators µX
and µY are called to be dependent if it is not possible to use one variable for both operators
and achieve the same action model.
For example, in the program,
(χ|aµX.La(ϕ|bLb(ψ|aX))) ∩ (χ|bµY.Lb(ψ|aLa(ϕ|bY )),
the operators µX and µY are independent. Note that the program
(χ|aµZ.La(ϕ|bLb(ψ|aZ))) ∩ (χ|bµZ.Lb(ψ|aLa(ϕ|bZ)),
describes the same action model. In contrast with the above example, in the following
program,
µX.La(ϕ|bµY.Lb(ψ|aX ∩ ψ|cLc(θ|bY ))),
the operators µX and µY are dependent.
It is easy to observe that the class 0RLP is the class of all basic learning programs,
BLP. We also wish to name 1RLP as the class of primitive recursive learning programs and
denote it also by PRLP.
To prove the next theorem, we need to clarify some notions in graph theory. Let
G = (N,E) be a directed graph. A simple loop L in the graph G is a sequence of
nodes 〈s0, s1, s2, ..., sn〉, such that for all i < n, (si, si+1) ∈ E, (sn, s0) ∈ E, and for all
0 ≤ i, j ≤ n, if i 6= j then si 6= sj . We call s0 the start-point of the simple loop L. Let
L = 〈s0, s1, s2, ..., sn〉 and L′ = 〈s′0, s′1, s′2, ..., s′m〉 be two simple loops. We say L′ is con-
nected to L by its start-point, if there exists 0 ≤ t ≤ n, st 6= s0 and st = s′0, and for all
0 ≤ i ≤ n and 0 ≤ j ≤ m if i 6= t and j 6= 0, then si 6= sj . A k-nested loop is a sequence
〈L1, L2, ..., Lk〉 of simple loops, such that for each i > 1, Li is connected to Li−1 by its
start-point.
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Theorem 4.15 We have the following hierarchy of recursive learning programs
BLP  PRLP  2RLP  ...  kRLP  (k + 1)RLP  ....
Moreover, it does not collapse to RLP, i.e, for all k,
kRLP 6= RLP,
Proof. See the Appendix.a
5 Concluding Remarks and Further Work
5.1 Related Works
We may compare epistemic learning programs with other approaches, like concurrent dy-
namic epistemic logic [8] and epistemic programs [5].
In concurrent dynamic epistemic logic [8], an epistemic action is interpreted as a relation
between S5 epistemic states and sets of S5 epistemic states. There are two main differences
between the interpretation of epistemic action in concurrent dynamic epistemic logic and
epistemic learning programs.
1. An epistemic action in concurrent dynamic epistemic logic is a relation between epis-
temic states whereas in epistemic learning programs, it is a function from epistemic
states to epistemic states.
2. Concurrent dynamic epistemic logic is just about S5 models whereas epistemic learn-
ing programs also considers K45 models.
Another difference is in the interpretation of the notion of learning. Our learning oper-
ator is an operator on action models, and LB(α1, α2, ..., αk) is a new action model, express-
ing the condition that agents in B learn that an action among α1, α2, ..., αk has occurred,
whereas the action α1 has actually occurred. For example, Lb(?ϕ, ?ψ) is an action model
which says:
ϕ is announced and agent b is suspicious whether he learns ϕ or learns ψ.
One may compare the above learning program with the action Lb(!?ϕ∪?ψ) in dynamic
epistemic logic, and observe that for all S5 epistemic state (M, s), we have that (M, s) ×
(NLb(?ϕ,?ψ), tLb(?ϕ,?ψ)) is bisimilar to (M, s)[[Lb(!?ϕ∪?ψ)]]. However, note that the learning
program Lb(Lb(?ϕ, ?ψ)) is equal to the learning program Lb(?ϕ), whereas, in dynamic epis-
temic logic, the action Lb(Lb(!?ϕ∪?ψ)) is equal to Lb(!?ϕ∪?ψ). Thus there is a difference
between the notion of learning we consider for learning programs and the notion of learning
considered in dynamic epistemic logic.
Despite of the above arguments, it seems possible to translate a class of action terms,
say α, in concurrent dynamic epistemic logic to a recursive learning program tr(α), such
that for all S5 epistemic state (M, s), we have that (M, s) × (Ntr(α), ttr(α)) is bisimilar to
(M, s)[[α]].
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Another way to represent information change is via the notion of epistemic program
introduced in [5]. Whereby the notion of action signature is introduced and by adding this
notion to the propositional dynamic logic PDL [13, 3], a logical language is obtained to
represent information change. However in this setting, no learning operator is considered,
and the information change is represented through action signature, alternative, sequential,
and iteration compositions. We focus on different kinds of learning; as the primitive notion
of information change is learning something by agents.
Another work related to ours is [10] where the epistemic programs are discussed by
adding a parallel composition operator to non-deterministic sum and sequential composi-
tion.
We showed that all finite K45 action models can be described by recursive learning
programs. It is also announced in [6] that every S5 action model can be described as a
concurrent epistemic action.
We showed that K45 models are models of the belief KD45 logic for applicable formulas.
In this way, to preserve the belief consistency of an agent, the agent is absent in the states
that conflicts his beliefs. A similar work has been done in [16], which assumes that a rational
agent rejects those incoming information which dispute his beliefs.
By introducing K45 models and actions, we may think of a theory of multi-agent belief
revision. A related work is [2], which generalize AGM [1], to a multi-agent belief revision
theory.
Our work presents a method to construct K45 action models through some basic con-
structors. Also in [11], it is introduced operators to compose epistemic models in order
to construct large models by small components representing agents’ partial observational
information.
5.2 Further work
5.2.1 A functional Semantics
As a semantics of epistemic learning programs, we associated a pointed action model to
every basic learning program. We may propose a functional semantics for the basic learning
programs, in the manner that each program is associated to a partial function from epistemic
states Mod to Mod. In this semantics, the meaning of learning operator is different form
the meaning we discussed in the introduction. Here, learning in epistemic states (M, s)
deals with two things, a set U of states of M . which includes the actual state s, and a set
of agents B ⊆ A (where A refers to the set of all agents). Learning with B ⊆ A and U ⊆ S
in the epistemic states (M, s) means that:
agents in B become aware that the actual state is among the states in U , and
other agents in A−B believe that nothing has occurred.
Let Φ be a set of epistemic formulas over a set of atomic formulas P and a set of agents
A. To each α ∈ BLP (Φ), we associate a pair (fα, Uα), where fα : Mod → Mod is a
partial function ,and for each epistemic state (M, s), Uα((M, s)) is a subset of S
′, where
fα((M, s)) = (M
′, s′) with M ′ = 〈S′, (⇀′i)i∈A, V ′〉.
For a recursive learning program µX.α(X), the associated partial function should sat-
isfy the fixed point equation, i.e., fµX.α(X) = fα ◦ fµX.α(X). As our forthcoming work,
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we aim to study this functional semantics. It seems to us that functional semantics and
recursive learning take us beyond the action models, that is, by functional semantics, epis-
temic learning programs can encodes information changes which cannot be encode by action
models.
5.2.2 A Logic for RLP
We need to provide a proof system for RLP as it is done for other approaches, like concurrent
dynamic epistemic logic [8], and action models [4, 5].
5.2.3 Notions of Learning
In Introduction, we put forward two meanings for 1. pointed action models (see 2.1) and
2. learning of an action model (see 2.2). We supposed that an action model describes
what is announced and what agents perceive based on their accesses to the resource of
announcement. We also assumed that the learning of an action by a set of agents is to learn
about the way information change. So our meanings of action models and learning refer to
the occurrence of information change.
We may propose two other meanings for pointed action models and learning of an action
model, which refer to disability in information change. In this way, an action model describes
the disability of agents in hearing or accessing the resource of announcement. For example,
the new meaning of the pointed action model (N1, s) in Figure 1,
Figure 1
is
“in the case of announcement of ϕ agent a hears ψ. ”
Note that the above meaning does not speak about what occurs in information change, but
it just describes a disability of agent a. Suppose ϕ = green and ψ = blue. The new meaning
of the pointed action model (N1, s) is that agent a has a color-blindness and if a green ball
is shown to her then she thinks that she sees a blue ball. Similarly, the meaning of learning
an action changes. The new meaning is learning about disability not about occurrence. The
learning of an action by a set of agents is to learn about the disabilities that the agents
have. Figure 22 shows two pointed action models where both refer to La((N1, s)) (agent a
learns the pointed action model (N1, s)), but one considers the occurrence meaning and the
other considers the disability meaning.
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Figure 22
In the occurrence meaning, agent a learns that ϕ is announced. In the disability meaning,
agent a becomes aware of her color-blindness, and after this learning, if she sees a blue ball,
she is suspicious whether it is green or blue.
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6 Appendix
Lemma 6.1 Let M = 〈S, (⇀a)a∈A, V 〉 be a Kripke model such that for each a ∈ A, ⇀a is
Euclidean. Then for all s ∈ S, if there is a state v ∈ S such that v ⇀a s then there exists
t ∈ S such that s ⇀a t.
Proof. Let S be a set of states and ⇀⊆ S × S be an Euclidean relation. Suppose s, v ∈ S
are arbitrary and v ⇀ s. By Euclidean property, we derive s ⇀ s, and we are done. a
Proof.3.5. Consider T (N) = 〈S′, (⇀′a)a∈A, pre′〉. Define R ⊆ S × S′ as follows. For all
s ∈ S and w ∈ S′,
sRw if and only if Π(w) = s.
We show that R is a bisimulation relation. Suppose all different the maximal closed con-
nected S5 submodels of N are M1,M2, ... and Mk. Assume sRw. Then w = (s, i), for
some 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
- Forth. Let s ⇀a t. Either a ∈ Bi or a 6∈ Bi. In the first case, since M i is closed, we
have t ∈ Si and thus (s, i) ⇀′a (t, i), and since tR(t, i), we are done. In the second
case, since N is a K45 model, and s ⇀a t, we have t ⇀a t, by Lemma 6.1. Therefore
there exists a maximal closed connected S5 submodel of N , say M j , such that t ∈ Sj
and a ∈ Bj . By Definition 3.4, (s, i) ⇀′a (t, j), and since tR(t, j) we are done.
- Back. Suppose (s, i) ⇀′a (t, j). Then by Definition 3.4, s ⇀a t, and we are done.
- Pre. It is straightforward.
30
aProof.3.6. The proof is by induction on the structure of basic learning programs.
First of all, note that for each epistemic formula ϕ, the graph of the action model
(N?ϕ, s?ϕ) is a tree.
Let α be a basic learning program and its graphG(Nα) be a tree. We show that the graph
G(Nψ|Bα) is a tree, for any arbitrary formula ψ and B ⊆ group(α). The maximal closed
connected S5 submodels of the action model Nψ|Bα are all the maximal closed connected
S5 submodels of Nα, say M
1,M2, ...,Mk, and the maximal closed connected S5 submodel
containing the state sψ|Bα, which is M
0 = 〈{sψ|Bα}, (⇀0a)a∈∅, pre0(sψ|Bα) = ψ〉. One may
check that
1. for all i, j ≥ 1, the edges between two nodes M i,M j in the graph G(Nψ|Bα) are the
same edges in the graph G(Nα),
2. for all i ≥ 1, there is no directed edge from M i to M0, as group of M0 is empty,
3. for all i ≥ 1, M0  M i if and only if there exists t ∈ Si, a ∈ Bi ∩ B, such that
sα ⇀a t in the model Nα.
Hence, if the graph G(Nα) has no loop, the graph of G(Nψ|Bα) would have no loop as well.
Let α1 and α2 be two basic learning programs such that group(α1) ∩ group(α2) = ∅,
and pre(α1) = pre(α2) and G(Nα1) and G(Nα2) are trees. Then the graph G(Nα1∩α2) is
a tree for the following reasons. The maximal closed connected S5 submodels of Nα1∩α2
consist of all the maximal closed connected S5 submodels of Nα1 , and all the maximal
closed connected S5 submodels of Nα1 , and the maximal closed connected S5 submodel
containing the state sα1∩α2 , which is M0 = 〈{sα1∩α2}, (⇀0a)a∈∅, pre0(sα1∩α2) = pre(α1)〉.
One may check that, since group(α1) ∩ group(α2) = ∅, there is no edge between the nodes
of the subtrees G(Nα1) and G(Nα2). So if the graphs G(Nα1) and G(Nα2) have no loop,
the graph of G(Nα1∩α2) would have no loop as well.
Assume α1, α2, ... and αm are basic learning programs such that their graphs have no
loop. The the maximal closed connected S5 submodels of NLB(α1,α2,...,αm) are the followings:
1. the S5 model M0 consists of m states (sα1 , 1), (sα2 , 1), ..., (sαm , 1), with accessibility
relations produced by agent-bisimilarity of group B (see Definition 3.2).
2. all the maximal closed connected S5 submodels of Nα1 , Nα2 , ..., Nαm .
The node M0 is the root of the graph G(NLB(α1,α2,...,αm)), and all the graphs G(Nα1),
G(Nα2), ..., G(Nαm) are disjoint subgraphs of G(NLB(α1,α2,...,αm)), such that the root may be
connected to them. Hence ifG(Nα1), G(Nα2), ..., G(Nαm) are trees, thenG(NLB(α1,α2,...,αm))
is a tree. a
Proof.3.8. Suppose (N, s0) is an S5 pointed action model. Let N = 〈S, (⇀a)a∈A, pre〉,
where S = {s0, s1, ..., sk}, and A = {a1, a2, ..., am}. As the model is S5, all accessibility
relations are equivalence relations. For each agent ai, let Pi = {D1i , D2i , ..., Dnii } be the
equivalence classes of the relation ⇀ai , which partitions the set S. Consider ni epistemic
formulas ψi,1, ψi,2, ..., ψi,ni , where none of them are KD45 equivalent to each other. For
each sj , 0 ≤ j ≤ k, consider the basic learning program αj
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αj = βj,1 ∩ βj,2, ...,∩βj,m,
where each βj,l is a basic learning program defined as follows
βj,l = pre(sj)|alLal(?ψl,h),
where sj ∈ Dhl .
The action model associated to the basic learning program LA(α0, α1, α2, ..., αk) is
(N, s0). Since for each agent a, the action models of two programs αj and αi are a-bisimilar
if and only if sj and si are in the same equivalence classes induced by the relation ⇀a. a
Proof.3.9. By induction on the height of the tree. Let hN be the height of the tree G(N).
If hN = 1, the action model N is an S5 model and by the Proposition 3.8, (N, s) is a
basic learning action. Suppose that for all h < k, if the graph of a K45 pointed model
(M, t) is a tree with height h, then (M, t) is a basic learning action. Assume hN = k. Let
M0,M1, ...,Mk−1 are all maximal connected closed submodels of N , and s is an state of
M0. We consider M0 as the root of the tree, and delete all nodes which are not reachable
from M0. That is because we want to state a program for the pointed action model (N, s),
and by deleting those maximal connected closed submodels which are not reachable from
s, we do not loose anything up to bisimilarity. Let M0 = 〈S0, (⇀0a)a∈B0 , pre0〉, where
S0 = {s01, s02, ..., s0n}, B0 = {a01, a02, ..., a0m} and s01 = s. AsM0 is an S5 action model, by using
Proposition 3.8, there is a basic learning program LB0(α1, α2, ..., αn), such that its action
model is (M0, s01), and each αi corresponds to a state s
0
i (see the proof of Proposition 3.8).
For each s0i , let {bi1, bi2, ..., bili} = groupT (N)(s0i ) − B0, where groupT (N)(s0i ) is the group of
agents of the state s0i in the model T (N). For each 1 ≤ j ≤ li, if s0i ⇀bij ti,j , for some state
ti,j of the model T (N), then as M0 is the root and is not accessible from tj , the graph of
the pointed action model (T (N), ti,j) is a tree with height less than k, and by the induction
hypothesis, there is a basic leaning program βi,j such that its action model is (T (N), tj).
For each s0i , let
γi = αi ∩ (pre(s0i )|bi1βi,1) ∩ (pre(s0i )|bi2βi,2) ∩ ... ∩ (pre(s0i )|biliβi,li).
The program LB0(γ1, γ2, ..., γn) is the desired program, that is, its associated action model
is (N, s). a
Proof.4.12. Let (N, s0) be a K45 pointed action model. Consider the action model
T ′(N). One may check that the followings hold true. Suppose Ma1 and M b2 are two different
components in T ′(N), then
1. if a = b, as both components are closed S5 models, there is no accessibility relation
for agent a between the two components,
2. if for some state s ∈ Ma1 and t ∈ M b2 , we have s ⇀b t, then for all v ∈ M b2 , we have
s ⇀b v, by transitivity and connectedness of M
b
2 .
Let n0,n1, n2, ...,nk be all different components of the model N . Also suppose n0 is a
component in which the actual state s0 appears. The model T
′(N) is a directed labeled
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graph in which the nodes are n0, n1, n2, ...,nk, and the edges are agents in A. To each node
ni, we correspond a variable Xi.
If the graph is a tree, then we are done and then we can construct a basic learning
program describing (N, s0). If the graph is not a tree, we unwind it to an infinite tree with
the root n0.
Figure 23
In the unwound infinite tree, there could be infinite nodes with the same name, say ni. For
all nodes w of the unwound tree, if w is a node with name ni (for some i) and exactly one
of its parents has the same name ni, then we cut the subtree rooted from w and change the
name of w from ni to variable Xi. In this way, a finite tree T
′′(N) is obtained.
Now we are ready to construct the desired program. We start from down to the top of
the finite tree T ′′(N).
1. First note that each leaf of the tree is either a variable or an a-component. If it is an
a-component, then we associate to that leaf, the program
La(?pre(v1), ?pre(v2), ..., ?pre(vm),
where v1, v2, ..., vm are all the states of the component. We note that as the a-
component is a connected S5 action model, it is associated to the program
La(?pre(v1), ?pre(v2), ..., pre(vm).
2. Suppose that nj is the name of a node w in T
′′(N), which either all of its children are
corresponded to a variable or a program. Two cases are possible:
– Case 1. Among the children of w there is no node corresponding to the variable
with the same index j, that is Xj .
For this case, suppose nj refers to a b-component with the states v1, v2, ..., vm.
For each state vl, and each agent a ∈ A, if there is a directed edge with label a
starting from the state vl to a children of w, say u, in the tree T
′′(N), consider
pre(vl)|aPa,l
where Pa,l is a program or variable corresponding to the node u. Then we
associate to the node w, the program
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Lb(
⋂
a∈A pre(v1)|aPa,1,
⋂
a∈A pre(v2)|aPa,2, ...,
⋂
a∈A pre(vm)|aPa,m)
– Case 2. Among the children of nj there are some nodes corresponding to the
variable with the same index j, that is Xj . For this case, we do exactly the same
as we did in the first case, thus obtaining the program
Lb(
⋂
a∈A pre(v1)|aPa,1,
⋂
a∈A pre(v2)|aPa,2, ...,
⋂
a∈A pre(vm)|aPa,m).
Then we associate the following program to the node
µXj .Lb(
⋂
a∈A pre(v1)|aPa,1,
⋂
a∈A pre(v2)|aPa,2, ...,
⋂
a∈A pre(vm)|aPa,m)
The program corresponding to the root of the tree T ′′(N) is a recursive learning program
which describes pointed action model (N, s0). a
Proof.4.15. In Theorem 3.6, it is proved that the graph of the action model of a basic
learning program is a tree. So none of the operations: alternative learning, concurrent
learning, wrong learning, produces any loops in the graph of a learning program. It is
easily seen by Definition 4.7 that, the only operation that makes loops in the semantics of
a learning program is the recursive learning operator. Therefore, if in a learning program,
there exist k times of dependent use of the recursive operator µ, then there exists at most a
k-nested loop in its graph. That is, for each k ∈ N, the graph of an action model associated
to a program in kRLP has at most k-nested loops.
For each k > 0, we introduce a learning program αk, such that its associated action model
belongs to kRLP but not (k− 1)RLP.
• k = 1. Let α1 = µX.Lb(ϕ|aLa(ψ|bLb(X))), where ϕ is not logically equivalent to ψ.
The associated action model of the learning program α1 is the action model (N3, s) in
Figure 3. Since ϕ and ψ are not logically equivalent, the two states (N3, s) and (N3, t)
(see Figure 3) are not bisimilar. If there exists a program β without any recursive
operator that its associated action model is bisimlar to (N3, s), then the action model
N3 would be bisimilar to a finite action model M
′ ∈ FAct, such that its graph is a
tree. Suppose R is a bisimilarity relation between N3 and M
′, and sRs′. Because of
bisimilarity, since s ⇀a t, there exists an state t
′ in model M ′, such that tRt′ and
s′ ⇀′a t′. Again, since t ⇀b s, there exists an state s′′ in M ′, such that sRs′′ and
t′ ⇀′b s
′′. The model M ′ is a tree, so we have s′′ 6= s′, and as s and t are not bisimilar,
we have s′′ 6= t′. Again, by bisimilarity, there exists an state t′′ in M ′, such that
s′′ ⇀′a t′′ and tRt′′. The new state t′′ is different from other states of M ′, since M ′
has no loop. In this way, M ′ is an infinite model, and we derive a contradiction.
• k = 2. The above argument can be done for k = 2, by considering the associated action
model of the program α2 = µX.La(ϕ|bµY.Lb(ψ|aX ∩ ψ|cLc(θ|bY ))) (see Figure 17),
where none of the formulas ϕ, ψ and θ are logically equivalent. If there is a program
β with at most one use of recursive operation, then the action model in Figure 17
(which has a 2-nested loop) would be bisimilar to an action model M , that its graph
has just one loop. This can easily be shown, since none of the states of the action
model in Figure 18 are bisimilar to each other, so the action model M ′ cannot be
finite.
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So for any arbitrary k, we can construct an action model having one k-nested loop, where
none of its nodes are bisimilar to each other. Then this action model is in kRLP but not
(k− 1)RLP. a
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